Abstract: This paper reports an experiment conducted to examine tacit collusion in posted offer markets. In addition to a baseline treatment, we study a 'forecasting' treatment, which allows an improved identification of intended signals, and a 'types' treatment, which examines pricing outcomes among cohorts of homogeneously 'cooperative' or 'competitive' subjects. Results indicate that while signals tend to affect subsequent pricing decisions, signaling does not affect long term transaction prices. On the other hand 'types' are stable across sessions and powerfully affect results. Markets comprised of 'cooperative' types tend to generate persistently higher transaction prices than do markets comprised of 'competitive' types.
Introduction
Laboratory markets organized under posted offer trading rules generate competitive outcomes in a robust collection of circumstances. Nevertheless, in a few rather specialized contexts, deviations from competitive (and static Nash equilibrium) predictions arise with some frequency. Experimentalists broadly attribute such deviations to tacit collusion. However, this 'tacitly collusive' behavior does not correspond at all closely with the type of coordinated outcomes that are the focus of attention by antitrust authorities. Rather than establishing a common price and coming to some agreement as to how that price is to be maintained, (as is contemplated as a source of concern, for example, in the 1992 U.S. DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines), supra competitive prices more typically vacillate substantially, both within and across markets.
An understanding of factors driving this sort of tacitly collusive behavior is important both to improve our understanding of behavioral oligopoly and, potentially, for antitrust policy. From a behavioral perspective, the tendency for participants to earn more than static Nash equilibrium predictions when earnings in the Nash equilibrium are very low is one of the standard stylized results of experimental analysis. Pertinent examples outside market contexts include 'prisoner dilemma' games, 'trust' games and VCM games. However, the price-setting game is distinct from these other games, since 'cooperative' and 'competitive' behavior are much more difficult to isolate, due both to the relatively high cost of unilateral cooperation, as well as to the richer scope of strategic actions.
1 From a policy perspective, an understanding of 'unorganized' tacit collusion may help enrich antitrust analysis. To the extent that sellers can collude without exhibiting any of the standard indicators of coordinated activity, antitrust authorities might seek richer alternative patterns of potentially problematic actions.
This paper reports an experiment conducted to gain some insight into the factors driving supra-competitive prices in posted offer markets. Specifically, we study two possible links between sellers and prices. First, we study price signaling. In an oligopoly environment where sellers have no opportunities for explicit collusion, communications sent in the form of prices in the market place represent the most probable method of coordinating behavior. Curiously, in the extensive experimental oligopoly literature, price signaling, and the effects of these activities on prices has not been a prominent topic of investigation (Durham et al. 2004 is an important exception). 2 One important impediment to a study of price signaling is the difficulty of distinguishing price signals from other motives for pricing decisions. For example, in addition to signaling an intention to cooperate in a period, a seller may increase prices in an effort to search the price space, or to compete with the anticipated prices of rivals in a subsequent period.
Here, we isolate price signaling activity by having sellers forecast the maximum price to be posted by rivals in a subsequent period. This forecasting game, in conjunction with a design in which the highest pricing seller sells zero units, allows a clean identification of an intended signal: Any price above a seller's forecast of his or her rivals' maximum price will result in sales of zero, and would be irrational unless the seller is signaling an intention to cooperate.
A second dimension of our investigation regards 'types' or individual propensities to behave either cooperatively or competitively. 'Type' has been identified as an determinant of behavior particularly in public goods contexts (e. g., Fiscbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001 , Burlando and Guala, 2005 , Kurzban and Houser, 2005 and Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe 2007 and is an important component of the new 'behavioral public finance'. However, in the context of oligopoly, individual propensities to cooperate or compete have largely been overlooked. Here, we use decisions from an initial series of sessions to classify participants in terms of a cooperativeness scale. In a pair of subsequent sessions we use this scale to identify cooperative and competitive cohorts, which we invited back for subsequent sessions to assess whether tendencies 2 In their pioneering oligopoly experiment Friedman and Hoggatt (1980) also discuss price signaling.
observed in the initial sessions were stable across treatments, and, the extent to which collecting like 'types' affects outcomes.
By way of preview, we find that both signaling and type affect market performance. Nearly all participants send signals, and those signals tend to elicit price responses. Signaling activity alone, however, does little to affect overall price levels.
Mean transaction prices are low in some markets with high levels of signaling activity, and, conversely, mean transaction prices are high in some markets where very few signals were sent. On the other hand, individual propensities to behave either cooperatively or competitively are relatively stable across sessions, and they very prominently affect market outcomes. Markets comprised of 'cooperative' types tend to generate high mean prices, while markets comprised of 'competitive' types tend to generate low prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below overviews the near continuous posted offer framework, and presents the experiment design and conjectures. A short section 3 explains experiment procedures. Sections 4 and 5 report experimental results. The paper concludes with a brief sixth section.
Experiment Design.
We use here a variant of a 'swastika' design initially studied by Smith and Williams (1989) which we examine in a 'near continuous' variant of the standard postedoffer institution developed by Davis and Korenok (2006) . Our design choice is advantageous in that it is both very easy for participants to understand, and it is an environment where tacit collusion has been previously observed (e.g,. Cason and Williams, 1990, Davis and Korenok, 2006) . The 'near continuous' variant of the posted offer institution usefully allows the collection of comparatively long series of both prices and prices signals in a relatively short time frame. Extensive repetition is particularly useful for an examination of signaling behavior, as any study of signaling requires that participants become experienced both with the primary market pricing game as well as the possible informational content of price deviations. Below we explain our implementation of the posted offer trading institution in subsection 2. at the bottom center of the figure make it clear that S1 posted the second highest price in period 3. Further, comparison of the bolded bars to the light gray bars, which summarize the previous period (period 2), shows that sellers S1, S2, S3 all reduced their prices in period 3 relative to period 2. In period 3, S1 sold three of the four units he offered and earned $6.60 (S1 also earned $1.00 from the forecasting game, explained below), as shown on the 'Period Earnings' bar chart. The earnings chart also indicates that seller S1's earnings in period 3 fell relative to period 2. The (simulated) buyer purchases seven units at any price of $6 or less. Our implementation of the 'swastika' design differs from previous implementations in that we impose a minimum price of $3 per unit. Given the excess supply of four units, in the 3 However, Davis (2006) also observes tacit collusion even when sellers have not static market power. Davis, Korenok and Reilly (2007) find that unless sellers are re-matched into new groups each trading period, the tacit collusion allowed by extensive repetition tends to undermine the predicted comparative static effects of reducing the number of sellers from 3 to 2. The purpose of the present paper is to study in closer detail this tacit collusion.
Market Design.
competitive equilibrium all sellers post a price of $3 and earn strictly positive expected earnings of $2.33 per trading period. Notice, that the competitive equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium for the market evaluated as a stage game. To see that this outcome is an equilibrium, observe that earnings will fall to zero for any seller who unilaterally raises price above a common price of $3. For uniqueness, observe that at common price above $3 a seller could increase earnings by posting a price 1¢ below the common price. For any vector of heterogeneous prices above $3, the highest pricing seller will sell nothing.
This design is useful for studying price signaling, for three reasons. First, previous research indicates that this design frequently stimulates tacit collusion (Cason and Williams, 1990, Davis and Korenok, 2006) . Second, the simple demand and cost conditions help participants understand underlying market structure, thus reducing the number of initial periods participants need to appreciate the pertinent incentives that the design induces. Third, the design (in conjunction with the forecasting treatment described below) helps isolate signaling activity. Given an excess supply of four units at any price at or below $6.00, the high pricing seller in any period is certain to sell zero units. Any seller posting a price in excess of the maximum price he or she expects rivals to post in the subsequent period can reasonably be interpreted as sending a signal to the other sellers.
Treatments and Conjectures.
Our experiment consists of three treatments: a baseline treatment, a 'forecasting' treatment, and a 'types' treatment. We describe these in turn, below.
2.3.1. Baseline. In the baseline treatment, participants make price decisions in a market consisting of 120 periods, using the supply and demand arrays shown in Figure 2 .
Each period lasts a maximum of 12 seconds. Participants are told as common knowledge the underlying aggregate supply and demand conditions. The final period is not announced in advance. Decisions in the baseline treatment allow us to verify that tacit collusion persists in this variant of the swastika design. In particular, we are concerned that the guarantee of positive earnings, induced by our inclusion of a minimum admissible price does not undermine the tacitly collusive behavior observed in other markets. This is our first conjecture.
Conjecture 1: Tacit collusion, in the form of prices in excess of those consistent with the competitive equilibrium, is resilient to the inclusion of both a minimum admissible price that guarantees a positive profit, and to a forecasting treatment.
Results of the baseline treatment are further useful in that they allow an analysis of the effects of other treatments, as discussed below. Otherwise the forecast prize is zero. Chesapeake
Forecasting.
A review of the screen display in Figure 1 illustrates the presentation of the forecasting game to sellers. After posting a price, the cursor moves to the 'forecast' box.
The seller then enters a price forecast and presses 'enter'. Forecast earnings are illustrated graphically as supplements to the period earnings bar. For example, in Figure   1 S1's forecast for period 3 was within 5¢ of the rival's maximum $4.30 so seller S1's earnings for period 3 are supplemented by $1.00, as indicated by the supplemental shaded box in the seller's earnings chart.
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The forecasting game, in conjunction with a design where the highest pricing seller sells zero units, allows a clean identification of an intended signal: Any price above a seller's forecast maximum price will result in sales of zero, and would be irrational unless the seller intends to send a signal. 5 To the extent that the forecasts allow a more precise identification of price signaling activity, we can examine the effects of our refined definition of signaling. 4 Our introduction of a forecasting game emulates the expectations elicitation techniques used in some early asset market experiments (e.g., Williams, 1987 , Smith, et al. 1988 and Dwyer et al. 1993 ). Concerns about biasing pricing behavior with the forecasting game are somewhat diminished relative to this earlier literature because sellers here are unable to use their market decisions to affect their chances of winning the forecasting game. 5 It is possible that a risk-seeking seller could post a price in excess of his or her signal. For example, suppose a seller believed that the maximum price others would post in the subsequent period was $4.00 with probability 2/3 and $4.15 with probability 1/3. This seller's, point forecast of the next period's maximum price is $4.05. Posting $4.05 would maximize expected earnings from the forecasting game. In the pricing game, a risk neutral seller would maximize earnings in by posting a price of $3.99 (yielding an expected profit from pricing of $3.96). However, if the seller was risk seeking, she might post a price of $4.14 to take advantage of the increased earnings available by shading under $4.15 (a possible $4.56). Although we cannot dismiss this possibility, we doubt that it importantly affected outcomes. Behavioral evidence suggests that few participants are risk seeking.
Conjecture 2: Price signals measured in terms of deviations from a seller's forecast of rivals' prices differ significantly from price signals based on previous period price postings.
We also explore the relationship between signaling and prices. 
Experimental Procedures.
To evaluate conjectures 1 to 5 we conduct the following experiment. In a first series of sessions, nine (and in one instance twelve) player cohorts are invited into the laboratory to participate in three (four) triopolies. At the outset of each session a monitor randomly seats participants at visually isolated computers. The monitor then reads aloud instructions, as the participants follow along on printed copies of their own. Each session consists of two 120 period sequences, a baseline sequence and a forecasting sequence.
Prior to the first sequence, instructions explain price-posting procedures, as well as the minimum admissible price of $3.00. Participants are also given as common knowledge full information regarding aggregate supply and demand conditions shown in Figure 2 .
To ensure that participants understand these underlying conditions the monitor elicits responses to a series of possible price postings. 6 After giving participants an opportunity to ask questions, the first sequence begins, and consists of 120 periods each with a maximum length of 12 seconds. After period 120, the baseline sequence is terminated without prior announcement, and participants record their earnings.
With the exception of a few MBA and graduate economics students, participants were volunteers recruited from upper level undergraduate business and economics classes at Virginia Commonwealth University in the spring semester of 2006. All participants in the initial set of sessions were 'experienced' in the sense that they had previously participated in a 'near continuous' posted offer session, but for a different study, with different supply and demand conditions. Earnings for the initial sessions, which lasted between 80 and 100 minutes, ranged from $21 to $46 and averaged about $31. In the two experienced sessions, earnings ranged from $21 to $57 and averaged $37.
6 Specifically, the monitor elicits sales and earnings calculations for the vectors ($5.50, $5.00, $4.00), ($7.00, $6.50, $6.01, and ($4.00, $4.00, $4.00). The first illustrates earnings calculations, and emphasizes that the high pricing seller is left out of the market. The second price vector emphasizes that prices must be $6.00 or less for positive earnings. The final vector explains the tie-breaking procedure.
Following the first sequence, a monitor remixes participants into entirely new groups, and reads instructions for a second sequence. 7 Conditions for the second sequence match those in the first, except that the maximum period length is increased to 18 seconds and the forecasting game is added. After giving participants time to ask questions, the second sequence began. After 120 periods, this sequence ended, again, without prior announcement. Following the forecasting sequence, participants complete a short questionnaire regarding the forecasting game. Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants are paid privately the sum of their earnings for the two sequences, converted at U.S. currency at a rate of $100 lab = $1 U.S. plus a $6 appearance fee, and are dismissed one at a time. We conducted five initial sessions, with a total of 48 different participants. No one participated in more than a single session. Mean transaction price paths for the forecasting sequences, shown in Figure 4 parallel results in Figure 3 in that prices generally exceed the $3.00 competitive prediction, and that outcomes vary substantially across markets. A comparison of the transaction price series across panels suggests that the addition of the forecasting treatment does little to affect pricing decisions. 8 In any case, the forecasting treatment clearly does nothing to dampen prices in this design. This is our first finding. Consider next the relationship between our refined signaling measure and the measure used previously by Durham et al. (2004) . For this comparison, we consider only outcomes in the forecasting sequences. A first question regarding signaling behavior is whether the refined identification of signaling (incorporating forecasts) appreciably strengthens our analysis. Specifically, we define a 'market-based signal' ('s m it ') as a price posted by participant i in period t that exceeds the maximum price posted in the previous period, which in our context is the lowest posted price that failed to attract buyers. Consistent with our analysis we define also a 'forecast signal' ('s f it ') as a price in excess of a seller's forecast of rivals' maximum posted price for a period. The histogram in Figure 5 were 'unintended' in the sense that a seller expected rivals' prices to be higher than the previous period's maximum price. As seen in column (4b) of (3) of Table 1 . This is a second finding. Borrowing terminology from the VCM literature, one might suggest that such instances be viewed as a sort of conditional cooperation, where a seller 'cooperates' by undertaking an increased risk of being the high pricing seller in a period. A critic might suspect that eliminating these small differences might make s m and s f similar. This suspicion, however, turns out not to be true. The bottom two rows of Table 1 Combined, these observations form our third finding. Signaling activity in markets illustrated as the extreme points in Figure 6 provides some insight into the very weak relation between signal volumes and price levels. Figure 7 illustrates the sequence of contracts in market f2-i, highlighted with a circle in Figure 6 .
Experimental Results

Finding 2: A signaling definition based on forecasting ('s f ') appreciably improves the identification of signals over a definition based on deviations from previous market prices ('s m '). Definition s m both understates the intentions of sellers to maintain prices or to retard price erosion, and misidentifies as signals price increases when they are below seller's expectations of rivals' prices.
The market generated the second highest overall mean transaction price, despite a comparatively small volume of 63 signals. As suggested by the sequence of price postings (' ', ' ' and '+' ) and signals (' ' about price postings) for market f2-i, the relatively infrequent signals were usually successful at preserving prices at or near the $6.00 limit. Persistent aggressive pricing by non-signaling sellers undermined signaling efforts at $6.00 as well as persistent efforts to stave off reductions in prices well below the upper bound of the pricing range.
Cooperative Types and Market Performance.
As a second dimension of this paper, we examine the effect of a basic propensity to behave cooperatively on market performance. Specifically, we used decisions from our initial sessions to attempt to identify the propensity of participants to cooperate.
Then we invited 'cooperative' and 'competitive' cohorts back for a second session.
Combined, Figures 7 and 8 suggest that while signaling activity is an element of cooperative behavior, signaling volume alone is insufficient to explain price levels. A second potentially important element of cooperative behavior includes some basic propensity of participants to follow, or at least not aggressively undercut, price leaders.
Thus, 'cooperativeness' must combine a measure signaling activity with measures of the propensity of a seller to 'follow.' Indeed, it is reasonable to anticipate that high signal values will often occur precisely in cases where price leaders find cooperation difficult to sustain.
As an index of cooperative propensity, we took a simple average of three factors The index, while admittedly ad hoc nevertheless has some appealing characteristics. The first of its components assesses a subject's propensity to act as a price leader. The second and third components assess a propensity to follow signals.
Using decisions from both the non-forecasting and forecasting sequences captures the robustness of this cooperative tendency in markets with different participants. Finally, using a simple average across the three components conforms with the notion suggested by Figures 6, 7, and 8 that while both cooperativeness and signaling activity are determinants of market performance, perhaps a tendency to follow merits increased weight.
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Despite some scheduling complications at the end of the spring semester we were able to recruit from both tails of our index measure. Overall, index values ranged from 1.4 to 52.4 and averaged 20.3. For the nine participants in our 'competitive' cohort the average index value was 9.8, and the highest value was 15.1. In our 'cooperative' cohort, the lowest value was 32.8 and the average index value 38.7
The structure of the second sessions replicated exactly the initial sequences, with a forecasting sequence following a baseline sequence. In recruiting for these second sessions participants may have realized that we were interested in specific participants.
However, participants did not know why we were interested in their participation, or that they were homogeneous with respect to the other people in their cohort. Earnings for these second two sequences ranged from $27 to $57 (inclusive of a $6 appearance fee) and averaged about $34.
Inspection of the mean transaction price series for the competitive and cooperative markets, shown respectively in the upper and lower halves of Figure 9 indicate clearly that types heavily influence price outcomes. Mean transaction prices for each of the six 'cooperative' markets exceed by substantial margins the comparable prices for each of the six 'competitive' markets. Further, the visual weight of the price spikes in competitive sequences tends to diminish the magnitude of the difference between the cooperative and competitive groups. Table 2 , which lists overall mean transactions prices for the cooperative and competitive markets, as well as for the initial markets, clarifies the treatment effect.
As shown in the table, relative to the baseline, transaction prices in the 'competitive' cohorts tend to be lower, and prices in the 'cooperative' cohort tend to be higher. The differences are large. Comparing across cooperative and competitive 9 Our multi-dimensional approach is in some respects consistent with Burlando and Guala (2005) . Observe that data from the initial sessions did not allow a clean division of participants into the 'cooperative', 'conditionally cooperative' and 'free riding' types considered standard in the VCM literature (e.g., Kurzban and Houser, 2005 or Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001) . Unlike the VCM context, nearly all subjects send some signals, and, given the cost of signaling, virtually all subjects subsequently undercut their own signals with price reductions. Thus, viewed in terms of the VCM literature nearly all participants in a pricing game are 'conditional cooperators.' Our cooperation index represents an effort to distinguish among these players.
cohorts, the overall mean transaction price for the cooperative sequences, $5.30, exceeds the comparable mean for the competitive sequences, $3.63, by $1.67, more than half the admissible price range. The difference is significant using a Mann Whitney test (p<.004). As the rightmost column in Table 2 indicates, the difference in mean transactions prices does not dissipate over time. For example, focusing on the last 60 periods, the difference in mean transaction prices across the cooperative and competitive sequences is $1.79 ($5.26 -$3.47), slightly larger than the $1.67 overall mean transaction price difference for the entire sequences.
The OLS regression reported as equation (3) As a final substantive issue we consider whether or not our type measures are reasonably stable across sessions. Equation (4) reports an OLS regression of the cooperation index realization for a seller in the initial session, 'c 1 ' on that seller's cooperation index realization for the second session 'c 2 ' for the 18 subjects who participated in a second session. The variability of cooperation index values within, but not across cohort types suggests that rivals actions may affect our measure of cooperativeness. A cooperative participant in an initially mixed group, for example, may appear to be more cooperative than in a group of homogenously cooperative competitors. Although we cannot dismiss the possibility that type is not constant, we consider it more likely that our measure of cooperativeness is imperfect. The intentions of cooperative players may involve decisions considerably more complicated than whether or not to send signals, and whether or not to undercut current prices. Nevertheless, we consider it remarkable that our measure of cooperativeness was so accurate in predicting second session behavior. 
Conclusion.
This paper examines two factors that affect the success of tacitly collusive arrangements in posted offer markets, signaling and types. To gain insight into signaling activity and its effects, we modify the standard posted offer market game with a 'forecasting' game, in which the seller predicts the maximum price to be posted by his rivals. This forecasting game allows us to isolate signaling behavior, because in our design any price above the maximum posted by rivals will result in the sale of zero units.
Thus, any price above a sellers forecast must be a signal. This refined measure of signaling reveals that sellers attempt to send price signals with a substantially higher frequency than was measured previously (using a price in excess of the maximum price in a previous period). Further, a reasonable number 'signals' under the standard signaling measure were mistaken in the sense that sellers mis-forecasted the price postings of rivals. Nevertheless, even with our refined measure of signaling, we find that while price signals elicit price responses within a market sequence, on the whole, signal volumes and overall price levels are uncorrelated. Factors other than signaling drive pricing outcomes.
As a second dimension, we construct a 'cooperation index' to examine the extent to which a subject's 'type' or basic propensity to behave cooperatively or competitively supplements signaling activity. We rank participants according to their revealed cooperativeness. Classifying subjects by their type, we conduct a second session where participants were collected into cohorts of 'cooperative' and 'competitive' types, and find that type very importantly affects performance. Overall price levels in 'cooperative' cohort markets were much higher than in 'competitive' cohort markets.
The notion that inherent behavioral propensities affect outcomes in games is certainly not a new idea in experimental economics. Indeed, as observed in the introduction, this notion now occupies a fairly central place in the VCM literature.
However, to the best of our knowledge 'type' has occupied only a minor role in oligopoly experiments. We believe our results strongly suggest that, at least in some oligopoly contexts, type may play a primary role in determining market outcomes. Further laboratory and field experiments in alternative market contexts are needed to more fully assess the impact of subject type on market competitiveness.
